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Abstract: In the realm of the philosophy of sounds and auditory ex-
perience there is an ongoing discussion concerned with the nature of 
sounds. One of the contestant views within this ontology of sound is 
that of the Property View, which holds that sounds are properties of 
the sounding objects. A way of developing this view is through the 
idea of dispositionalism, namely, by sustaining the theory according 
to which sounds are dispositional properties (Pasnau 1999; Kulvicki 
2008; Roberts 2017). That portrayal, however, is not sufficient, as it 
has not inquired the metaphysical debates about dispositions beyond 
the conditional analysis. In this paper, I try to advance this view by 
including recent developments (for instance Bird 2007; Vetter 2015) 
in the field of dispositionalism and I analyse whether this new version 
can sort out known and new objections to Property View.  
Keywords: Audibility; dispositions; ontology of sound; potentiality; 
property view; sounds. 
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0. Introduction 
 Imagine that you are sitting next to a river, having a picnic with friends. 
It is a sunny but slightly chilly day, so you are wearing gloves. You take 
your beer bottles to make a toast and, as the bottles collide, you are sur-
prised to realise that your bottle seems to be made of plastic instead of 
glass. The gloves had prevented you from realising that it was a plastic 
bottle and, because in shape and colour it imitates glass beer bottles, only 
the lack of the characteristic sound of clinking glasses gives away the ma-
terial it is made of. When you finally take a sip, the feeling on your lips 
confirms what the sound had hinted: it is indeed a plastic bottle.  
 This little scene relates to different issues regarding the philosophy of 
sounds: the relation of sounds and sources (Nudds 2010; Casati, Di Bona, 
Dokic 2013; O’Callaghan 2007b; Fowler 2013), the problem of perceptual 
justification (Handel 2006), the issues of sense multimodality (O’Callaghan 
2011) and, last but not least, the problem of the nature of sounds (O’Cal-
laghan 2007; O’Shaughnessy 1957; Pasnau 1999; Roberts 2017). The latter 
is the one I am concerned with in this paper. Is it possible to say that plastic 
has a different sound than that of glass? I think it is intuitive to answer 
‘yes.’ In order to justify this intuition, I will appeal to a view in the ontology 
of sounds that should explain this in a satisfactory sense, that is the dispo-
sitional view or sound dispositionalism.  
 Typically, by dispositions we mean things such as fragility, solubility, 
irascibility and the like. Dispositions are properties that, under certain cir-
cumstances, could manifest themselves. The suffix ‘ity’ is quite indicative 
of those cases. This paper is about those sorts of properties and it examines 
the possibility of claiming that “sound” is a sort of disposition. It can be 
said that an object has “the disposition to sound” or, seemingly, “sonority” 
if so and so occur. It will be a matter of dispute what the nature of this “so 
and so”—namely, the conditions—is about. 
 The debate is circumscribed in the frame of Sound Ontology (SO), 
which, in this sense, has split into three views: the wave view (WV), where 
sounds are considered as acoustic waves (WV) as physics and, more pre-
cisely, acoustics tend to say; the property view (PV), where sounds are 
either properties of the perceiving mind (PV1), as psychology presumably 
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argues, or properties of the object (PV2); and, finally, the event view (EV), 
where sounds are considered as events (O’Callaghan 2007a, 2009, among 
others, favours this stance). Seemingly, the dispositional view would belong 
to PV2, or so it has been interpreted by those who have taken this route. 
 I must clarify that my purpose is not to decisively advocate for a dispo-
sitional view on sounds. I am not trying to convince you to accept the thesis 
that sounds are dispositional properties of objects. My commitment in this 
paper is related to the consequences and implications of such dispositional 
account. 
 This is not the most popular view in SO. Actually, the so-called property 
view, mostly labelled as such when it is criticised, rarely unfolds in a way 
that takes the global philosophical discussion on properties into account: 
are they universals? Are they tropes? There is only a handful of allusions 
in this sense: P. F. Strawson (1959), on the one hand, and Edmund Husserl 
(1984), on the other, have made some type-token considerations of sound 
as universal (for instance the C note) and as a particular (the playing of 
the note C for instance), but that does not take sound as if it were a prop-
erty of an individual.1 This, I argue, is due to a problem of under-specifica-
tion, common to all the views that figure in the SO.2 The field is thus in 
need of further development. 
 This applies for the dispositional account of sounds, which is a species 
within PV, and more precisely PV2. Three authors in particular, Pasnau 
(1999), Kulvicki (2008), and Roberts (2017), have advanced this view. Yet, 
sound’s characterisation as a disposition has not been elaborated close to 
the spirit of the long metaphysical debate on dispositions. Only Roberts 
(2017, 347) mentions in passing the problems pertaining the conditional 
analysis, let alone newer considerations on the problems of modality and 
                                                 
1  As known, the fact that sounds do not coincide with the idea of basic particular 
in Strawson’s metaphysics, namely that of the material body, is what motivates the 
examination of such problematic ‘individuals.’ The revival of sounds as a matter of 
philosophical discussion most likely comes from Strawson. 
2  A notorious exception in that of Jonathan Cohen (2010, 205) who considers uni-
versal and/or trope form of abstract properties, while tackling linguistic objections 
against PV. 
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potencies (Vetter 2011a, 2011b, 2013a, 2015). Thus, a first goal of the paper 
is to achieve a more complete picture of the dispositional view. 
 The first section will provide a picture of Sound Ontology, hopefully 
short but compelling. The second section will present the current state of 
affairs of the dispositional view on sounds. A third section introduces the 
classical considerations from the dispositions’ debate—its features under the 
conditional analysis and the newer potentiality argument—to the discussion 
on sound. In a fourth section, I want to learn if a new version of sound 
dispositionalism can withstand the criticisms that some authors (O’Calla-
ghan 2011; Casati and Dokic 2014) have raised against the dispositional 
account and to evaluate its prospects for the future within the realm of SO.  
 In this article my contention is to bring two debates together: that of 
the philosophy of sounds and auditory experience and that of dispositions. 
A brief literature review, especially in the first and third sections, is neces-
sary to make intelligible the conceptual exchange between both discussions. 
This characterisation, however, is not free of difficulties and I do not take 
for granted that sounds are dispositions. Even more, since I am not sure 
sounds or sonority are dispositions, I have opted for the title “If sounds 
were dispositions…” and by doing so I also want to make more explicit the 
character of this inquiry as hypothetical. 
1. The ontology of sound 
 The expression “Ontology of sounds” refers to the effort to define what 
sounds are. There are, to my knowledge, two general proceedings in that 
quest: the purely ontological taxonomy of theories, which is elaborated by 
O’Callaghan (2007a, and with Nudds 2009), and the topological approach 
(the label is mine), which inquiries where sounds are (Casati and Dokic 
1994, 2005). Both taxonomies overlap in some regards, but not in others. 
 The first ontological choice to make is that of deciding whether sounds 
are properties or individuals. For some (Roberts 2017), this is what divides 
the ontologies of sound. There are, however, more diversified approaches. 
In O’Callaghan’s taxonomy, for instance, this amounts to three possibili-
ties: the wave view (WV), the property view (PV), and the event view 
(EV).  
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 The Wave View (WV) claims, from Aristotle3 to modern acoustics, that 
sounds are acoustic waves. Despite its popularity, there are a number of 
issues that WV cannot account for. The most important one is that it pre-
supposes an Error Theory of perception:4 we, for one, do not perceive sounds 
to be at any acoustic wave as a vibration in an elastic medium. We perceive 
them as coming from a source (a sounding object, an event, etcetera).  
 This gives rise to what we can consider as the phenomenological desid-
eratum, which any prospect of SO should comply with. At least, O’Calla-
ghan (2007a, 14) notices, it is better to choose a theory that explains the 
phenomenological aspect of sound, to one that does not. Authors differ on 
the degree of importance they assign to it, some take it as a necessary 
constrain, some as an inescapable requirement, and some consider it a dis-
cussion they could bypass.5  
 Another option is that of PV, which is twofold: it either describes sounds 
as properties of the perceiving mind (PV1) or it describes sounds as prop-
erties of the sounding objects (PV2). The most common one is that of PV2, 
ever since John Locke described them in his Essay as “secondary qualities.”6 
Typically, secondary qualities are thought of as being qualities of the objects 
somehow enabled, detected and identified by our perception. However, it is 
far from decisive that secondary qualities in general (let alone sounds) are 
                                                 
3  Aristotle is usually considered in such fashion in many historical accounts 
(Pasnau 1999, 310; Casati and Dokic 2014).  
4  In neuroscience we can find a similar problem while dealing with vision and the 
so-called “inverse problem” in a Berkeleyan fashion. The information in the retina 
does not correspond directly to the real structure of the world, so how is it possible 
that we respond successfully on the basis of vision? (Purves 2010) 
5  Such assessment is visible while pointing out to the ‘Error Theory’ as a major 
inconsistency to be resolved or that undermines the whole effort for searching a co-
herent view on the nature of sound, that is the case with Pasnau (1999), Casati and 
Dokic (2014).  
6  In the seventh chapter of the second book (‘On Ideas’) from the Essay Concern-
ing Human Understanding, while addressing the simple ideas, Locke formulates the 
notion of “primary and secondary qualities.” Primary qualities are those that are 
inseparable of a body, for instance, solidity or extension; whereas, secondary qualities 
are “nothing in the objects themselves but power to produce various sensations in 
us” (Locke 1999, 117). Such is the case of sounds.  
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exclusively objects’ properties as there is an ongoing discussion on whether 
they could also, or instead, being regarded as properties of the perceiving 
mind (see, for instance, Egan 2006). In such scenario, we would face PV1.  
 PV1 would be focused on sound as a purely an auditory phenomenon 
and, therewith, it would permit auditory hallucinations to be considered as 
sounds, since sounds’ privacy would be plausible (this is an anathema for 
O’Callaghan 2007a). Not only that, but there would be as many sounds as 
hearers (Casati and Dokic 2014). Sound would lie, thus, in the ear of the 
beholder. No philosopher seems to be explicitly endorsing this stance, but 
there are interpretations that may implicitly argue in favour of it: O’Calla-
ghan (2007), Casati and Dokic (2014) point to D. L. C. Robert Maclachlan’s 
Philosophy of Perception (1989, New York, Prentice Hall); Casati and Dokic 
(2009, 103), additionally, mention O’Shaughnessy (1957). There is even 
mention of Edmund Husserl and Franz Brentano, usually overlooked in the 
analytical debates on sounds, as potentially approaching this view (Méndez-
Martínez 2020).  
 In the same guise, O’Callaghan (2009, 34) appeals here to the argument 
from the vacuum, for which there are two ways of arguing this: either one 
says that a medium is a necessary condition for sound (a bell struck in the 
vacuum does not make any sound); or you say that the audible properties 
of sound (namely, timbre, pitch and loudness) cannot be afforded in the 
absence of a medium, and do not produce a veridical perception. PV2, as 
I elaborate below, is at odds with these arguments.  
 Finally, we have the event view (EV), defended by O’Callaghan (2007a, 
2009)7 and somehow by Casati and Dokic (2014). O’Callaghan defends what 
the latters label as “Located Event Theory,” whereas the option defended 
by Casati and Dokic is that of the “Relational Event Theory.”  
 To say that “sounds = events” is to claim that they are spatiotemporal 
localisable occurrences that are to be identified neither with properties nor 
with waves. EV tries to deliver in the case of the phenomenological desid-
eratum. Another key aspect that will mark a difference with any potential 
                                                 
7  Despite being considered as the most representative figure in EV, O’Callaghan 
has employed other labels for more current elaborations: the mereological position, 
for instance, which considers the causal sources of sound as a “part” of sound (O’Cal-
laghan 2011).  
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PV2, dispositional view included, is that EV relies in the manifestation of 
sound: whenever there is a sound, there is a sounding (O’Callaghan 2009, 
36). EV pays a great deal of attention to the problem of relating to sources 
and, in that sense, it is probably the view that encompasses the most in its 
effort to explain sound. In reporting so, things complicate to the extent that 
some have preferred to cast aside causality, sources and just addressing 
“pure events” (Scruton 2009). A problem this theory has, among many that 
are beyond the scope of this paper, is that it must provide several explana-
tions to specify the location of sounds; echoes and Doppler effect are recur-
ring puzzling cases (Casati and Dokic 2014; O’Callaghan 2007b; Fowler 
2013).  
 In addition, as with the other views, EV is not free from the problem of 
under-specification. Although maybe not as properties, events represent an-
other large topic in ontology and metaphysics to which EV relates to at 
a lesser extent.  
 This is the purely ontological classification. Precisely because of the 
problem of location and spatiality, Casati and Dokic (1994, 2014) consider 
that deciding where sounds are warrants as much explaining as the matter 
of what they are. For them, there are three broad conceptions of sound: 
proximal, which locates sound at or in the hearer; medial, which locates 
sound between the hearer and the sounding event/object; and distal, which 
locates sound at the sounding object or event.8  
 In short, these are the views that compose SO, which, in my opinion, 
offer a general description of the discussion. There are other particular clas-
sifications depending on what is being inquired. Scruton (2009) thinks of 
physicalist and non-physicalist conceptions, where common rival views such 
as that of Pasnau and O’Callaghan fit, for him, in the physicalist row. Dokic 
(2007), who reviews the tensions between the “unique event” and the “re-
peatable object” ontologies, is another example.  
 Let us now evaluate the proposal in question: the dispositional view. 
                                                 
8  There are some correspondences between both taxonomies. WV, for instance, is 
clearly distal; whereas EV is presumably distal, although it sometimes seems to make 
some concessions that put it close to WV (Casati and Dokic 2014). PV1 is proximal, 
whereas PV2 is distal.  
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2. Sound dispositionalism, a state of art 
 A preliminary outline is useful. On these views, sounds are properties 
and, curiously enough, most proponents of a PV point out to dispositional 
properties. However, in the large debate concerning properties there are 
other available options on how to draw on properties, yet philosophers of 
sound have chosen this one.9 I will analyse in the conclusions whether this 
compromises, or not, this view.  
 This dispositional view is a sort of PV and, seemingly, it is PV2, because 
the argument points out the disposition-to-sound in the object, rather than 
in or at the hearer. If the dispositional locates what is going on at the object, 
it is certainly not medial nor proximal, but rather distal. If it locates sounds 
at the hearer, then it is proximal.  
 These implications will be clearer further on. For now, let us elaborate 
on the state of affairs of the dispositional view that, though unpopular in 
the overall philosophical discussion on sound, is not without representatives 
(Pasnau 1999; Kulvicki 2008; Roberts 2017; and, at a certain extent, Cohen 
2010).  
 Pasnau’s paper is probably one of the most influential sources in the 
field of the philosophy of sounds, which is probably due to its contribution 
to the revival of the debate. In it, Pasnau proposes:  
...identifying sound with the vibrations of the object that has the 
sound. More cautiously, I would say that sounds either are the 
vibrations of such objects, or supervene on those vibrations. The 
former would imply a physicalist account of sound, whereas the 
latter would have room for a dispositional account. (Pasnau 1999, 
317) 
 However, the part concerning the supervenience on vibrations does not 
do the job in showing strong adherence to a dispositional model. An issue 
                                                 
9  A case of an adherent of this view who is not championing a dispositionalist 
alternative is Jonathan Cohen (2010). He elaborates on the idea that the character-
istic temporal feature of sound is usually taken to be at odds with its characterisation 
as a property. Although his defence does not mention dispositions, his treatment 
could serve dispositional arguments.  
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that here seems innocuous is that of sounds “supervening.” Usually, the 
expression used is that of “being instantiated by” while describing exactly 
the same (for instance O’Callaghan 2007a, 66). It is yet to be inquired, 
though, on whether they are equivalent and exchangeable sentences,10 for 
the appeal to supervenience has been contested for some of those who are 
disposition realists, and a dispositional account of Anti-Humean inspiration 
would spare us of modelling through the idea of supervenience, as I will 
elaborate in the next section.  
 Although Pasnau does not go deeper in this, he formulates one of the 
key ideas for the dispositional account while saying that objects have sound 
(Pasnau 1999, 316). This goes against the grain concerning the ordinary 
language use of sound as something that is “made” and not “had” (Pasnau 
1999, 310). Not only in this having/making sound distinction has Pasnau 
paved the way down for sound dispositionalism but also regarding the ap-
peal to colour. In so doing, he has a very different attitude towards colour 
analogy than that of O’Callaghan’s (2007a), which goes against the ‘tyr-
anny’ of the visual.11  
 Besides the distinction and the appeal to colour analogy, Pasnau does 
not add more on how this dispositional account could be. In the end, the 
                                                 
10  I fear they are not, because although at a certain point we can use them without 
reserves, while being specific ‘supervenience’ commits us to a metaphysical picture 
(the Lewis-Humean one) which could have, or not, unwarranted features on how the 
world is structured.  
11  If considered as an endeavour within the philosophy of senses or the philosophy 
of perception, the philosophy of sounds and auditory experiences shares a relatively 
common ground with that of colour and vision: there are ontological discussions on 
the nature of both colour and sounds; there are several positions concerning the 
phenomenological content of our auditory and visual experiences, and so forth. How-
ever, when compared to the forays in the realm of colour and vision, the philosophy 
of sounds and auditory experience is considerably less developed. Not only that, but 
it has browsed, at large, many of the discussions that have taken place in the phi-
losophy of colour and vision. Trying to explore, independently, new paths for the 
auditory phenomena is a task that O’Callaghan undertakes, rebelling against the 
‘tyranny of the visual.’ Of course, not all the philosophers in this new field would 
agree with such assessment and particularly those defending dispositional views 
(Pasnau, Kulvicki, Roberts), for they appeal to an analogy with colour.  
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goal of his paper is rather the criticism towards the “standard view.” By 
using such label, Pasnau refers to both WV and PV—arguably PV1—, 
whose conflation is rather incoherent because it allows and even endows an 
‘Error Theory’ of perception. 
 John Kulvicki has a more detailed argument to offer. In his view, sounds 
are “stable properties” of the objects. Concerning the other philosophers’ 
taxonomies and classifications, in O’Callaghan’s taxonomy, this would 
clearly classify as PV. The same can be said of Casati’s and Dokic’s classi-
fication. When Kulvicki states that: “sounds are perceived to have locations, 
and those locations seem to correspond to the objects that make the sounds” 
(Kulvicki 2008, 1), he chooses a “distal” view. But, beyond these brandings, 
his account is also ‘dispositional,’ as he adds that: “Perhaps sounds are not 
vibrations per se but dispositions to vibrate in response to certain kinds of 
stimulation” (Kulvicki 2008, 4).  
 The core of the argument, for Pasnau and Kulvicki, lies on colour anal-
ogy. Sounds are usually thought of as “transient” as opposed to colours that 
are “stable properties” of the objects that possess them (Dokic [2007] thinks 
precisely this while theorising on the opposition unique-repeatable). The 
key claim is the following:  
As objects still have their colours in the dark, they also “have” sounds 
even in the vacuum or without vibrating, those sounds cannot be 
heard.  
 Kulvicki (2008, 5) considers that objects have “resonant modes,” de-
pendent on their material structure—remember the plastic beer bottles—
that cause them to vibrate. Objects are disposed to vibrate when 
“thwacked.” Here Kulvicki is getting closer to the standard conception of 
dispositions through the lens of conditional analysis. The ‘thwack,’ a way 
of imparting energy to the object (Kulvicki 2008, 9), is the stimulus condi-
tion; the sound made—seemingly—, its manifestation. But having a sound 
is not the same as making it. It is easy to think of objects that make sounds 
that they don’t have: a speaker, for instance. Appealing to colour analogy, 
one might say that a projection in the movie theatre is showing (“making”) 
coloured images, when the colour, indeed, isn’t there. Notice how, by 
switching to colour analogy, we employ different verbs. 
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 This possession of sound, so to speak, represents, for Kulvicki, a stable 
property that licences the possibility of dispositional talk, although he does 
not draw beyond on the literature. All this would lead us to identify the 
expression “had sound” with dispositions, and that of “made sound” with 
the manifestation, which, formulated as such, is a rather circular argument. 
However, there are alternatives specifications. 
 A more elaborated and/or explicit depiction on the dispositional account 
for sounds is that of Roberts’s (2017), who relies at large in the property view 
for colour. Having divided the views between property and non-property, 
Roberts groups eleven possible views within PV, according to their potential 
compliance with three features: being dispositional or not dispositional (thus, 
categorical); being reductive or non-reductive; being relational or non-rela-
tional. Something not clearly explicit here is whether not having some of the 
features mentioned by Roberts means that they necessarily lack them.  
 A first interesting aspect is that, unlike Pasnau and Kulvicki, he does 
consider a non-dispositional possibility for PV. Here ‘non-dispositional’ 
means categorical, for which one of the options is vibrationism (that is, 
appealing to vibrational structure), which is also a reductive view. As for 
the dispositional ones, they have revolved around the possibility of wave 
dispositionalism (that is, the overt disposition to produce an acoustic wave) 
and vibration dispositionalism (like Kulvicki’s thwack).  
 When we consider perceived sound (or sound appearance) things get, as 
usual, thornier: a conditional analysis like-spirit is still present, for here 
“sounds are dispositions to auditorily appear in certain ways if certain 
conditions are met” (Roberts 2017, 346). Here we have an internal sound 
dispositionalism and an external one. The difference is that the external one 
does distinguish between sound and apparent sound, thus enabling us to 
explain differences of change and constancy. However, apparent sounds 
seem difficult to conceive if not taken as experiences of sounds. Finally, on 
the possibility of connecting the dispositional and relational features, Rob-
erts notices that they do not have to come necessarily together. This be-
comes an important issue to discuss the differences between sound, in a phe-
nomenal sense, and the objectual sound.12 
                                                 
12  Talking about ‘internal’ and ‘external’ could lead us to hasty associations. For 
instance, we could say that the former matches, at a certain extent, with PV1, while 
12  Jorge Luis Méndez-Martínez 
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 So far, in Roberts’ treatment the dispositional account is more complete. 
He concocts these varieties in a hypothetical fashion, as they are not being 
argued for currently. Kulvicki would happen to be a vibration disposition-
alist, viewed from this lens.13 Another issue to bear in mind is that he de-
picts sound dispositionalism in the fashion of conditional analysis and, even 
more, he is aware that this way of dealing with dispositions might face 
theoretical obsolesce. Yet he does not appeal to alternative views on dispo-
sitions. In the following sections, I highlight the so far implicit elements of 
sound dispositionalism à la façon de Lewis and I also undertake its shaping 
into a more current discussion. 
3. A dispositional view, from conditional  
analysis to potentiality 
 A word at the broader level of the discussion on dispositions is required. 
Dispositions, as I have said, are a genre of properties. The other genre is 
that of categorical properties. The main difference lies in the fact that dis-
positional properties are instantiated under certain conditions, while the 
categorical ones are instantiated in all conditions. It is common to think, as 
well, that the latter are constant, while the formers are not; that the latter 
are observable, while the others are not (if not being manifested at the 
                                                 
the latter with PV2. But that is not exactly the case, because the focus of the features 
sorted by Roberts is not aimed at bestowing the property either to objects or 
subjects, but on how they both relate to sound appearance. The same caveat goes 
for trying to associate this to the externalist/internalist discussion within the phi-
losophy of mind and language. I do not mean that these aspects should remain 
separated from the features outlined here, it is just that so far the discussion is 
rather narrow.  
13  The whole spectrum proposed by Roberts encompasses the following options: 
non-relational primitivism, vibrationism, disjunctive vibrationism, disjunctive wave/ 
vibration dispositionalism, primitive appearance relationism, reductive appearance 
relationism, vibration relationism, apprearance sound dispositionalism, wave dispo-
sitionalism, vibration dispositionalism, as well as an unavailable view which would 
happen to be dispositional, non-relational.  
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moment).14 This division, as fundamental as it is, roughly mentioned by 
Roberts’ taxonomy, is usually cast aside in the debate on sounds. This, as 
seen in the conclusions, could be of major importance for anyone who fa-
vours PV’s varieties.  
 In the big picture of metaphysics, Humeans and Anti-Humeans wage 
a battle concerning their understanding in the structure of the world. There 
are many arenas for this (for instance causality, modality, and observabil-
ity/non-observability), being the nature of properties one of them. More 
concretely, the label “Anti-Humean” is employed while alluding to David 
Lewis’s metaphysics, which strongly appeals to Humean supervenience, 
whose formulation goes as follows: “All there is in the world is a vast mosaic 
of local matters of particular fact, just one little thing over then another” 
and this has an impact in how laws are conceived: “The laws of the world 
supervene on the totality of local matters of particular fact” (Lewis 1986b: 
ix). If there is an accepted understanding on both sides it is that of Humean 
supervenience as the core of Humeanism and Lewis as its endorser.  
 Typically, Humeans defend categorical properties and Anti-Humeans, 
dispositional ones. But this is an oversimplification as the matter is, indeed, 
which of the two are the most fundamental. In this sense, two monist posi-
tions are on sight: either every sparse property (namely, natural properties) 
is categorical or it is dispositional. A middle ground could recognize that 
there are properties on each side. One can also accept dispositions (or ‘dis-
position talk’ á la Ryle), without committing ultimately to this. The oppo-
site view would be dispositionalist realism.  
 This corresponds to a deeper review of our view on metaphysics and the 
philosophy of sounds and auditory experience could perhaps dispend with 
                                                 
14  We should not understand this in a visualist form. Observables entities are those 
that we can perceive with any of our senses, in normal conditions; unobservables 
don’t. Yet some unobservables are detectable by using certain instruments (suba-
tomic particles, for instance) and some are not detectable but have rather an ex-
planatory role (Chakravaty 2007, 14–15). There is, of course, a critical aspect in this, 
as being “non-observable” used to be an anathema for the empiricist Weltanschau-
ung, although being non-observable does not constitute a reason to rule out disposi-
tions anymore. As, for the strictly scientific point of view, there are many entities, 
like quarks, whose status in this sense is non-observable. 
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this. However, the difference could have some relevance while understand-
ing the available dispositionalist projects and some falsifiability criteria.  
 Back to business, both Kulvicki and Roberts have drawn on a profile of 
the long debate on dispositions that depends on the conditional analysis. 
However, the standard view on dispositions has been discussed (Armstrong 
1996; Martin 1996), criticised (Bird 1998), reviewed (Lewis 1997) and dis-
missed by some authors (Bird 2007; Vetter 2015). This warrants a concise 
revisit to the guidelines of the conditional analysis. Let us take a quick view 
on it. Following no other than Lewis (1997b), the conditional analysis states 
that:  
CA: Something x is disposed at time t to give response r to stimulus s 
iff, if x were to undergo stimulus s at time t, x would give response r.  
In short, this is usually capsuled by the formula D (S, M), that is, the ordered 
pair of stimulus and manifestation (or response).15 We can see how it fits 
the problem of sound.  
 Now, the disposition to sound would be given by the pair formed by a 
stimulus (eg. Kulvicki’s ‘thwack’) and, on the other hand, a manifestation 
(either if it is the vibration or the wave, that is, vibration dispositionalism 
or wave dispositionalism in Roberts’s terms). This looks simple and com-
pelling. The conditional analysis picture can be, however, more specific. For 
instance, it can distinguish between covert dispositional property names or 
nouns (such as ‘fragility’, ‘solubility’, etcetera); covert dispositional predi-
cates in adjective form (such as fragile, soluble); overt (canonical) disposi-
tions descriptions ‘the disposition to M when S’; and overt dispositional 
predicates ‘x is disposed to M, when S’ (Bird 2007, 18). Given that sound 
                                                 
15  Although this line of argument is immediately associated to Lewis, we had to go 
back a bit earlier to authors like Carnap and Ryle. Carnap (1936, 448), who intro-
duces essentially the same definition but with a more elaborated formula, is con-
cerned that disposition-terms don’t enable semantic reduction—a ‘dogma’ later crit-
icised by Quine (1961). Ryle (1949, 31), on the other hand, identifies dispositions’ 
ascriptions as those that allude to a particular change when an object is under certain 
conditions. These semantics are known as the “simple conditional analysis” (Choi 
and Fara 2016). All this is to say that conditional analysis is not entirely Lewis’s 
doing. His attention was dedicated to its reformation, rather than the simplistic 
formula. 
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does not commonly figure as a disposition, it is perhaps artificial to say that 
we can easily appeal to “sonority” or “sounding,”16 whereas the former is, 
in the ordinary language, describing a conduction quality of an object 
(something you could say of a musical instrument or a performer of a mu-
sical instrument for example), the latter has been used to describe the man-
ifestation. It seems that sound ought to be overtly formulated as “the dis-
position the sound” or “x is disposed to sound iff... certain conditions are 
met.” The conditions could be, in a first moment, the object having resonant 
modes or a vibrational structure and a medium of propagation. 
 A specification that is worth bearing in mind is that pertaining single 
and multi-track dispositions. A disposition D can have multiple manifesta-
tions: a fragile glass can break, but it also can just get cracked and so forth; 
or, as Ryle’s (1949, 107) example goes, the disposition of knowing French 
can be manifested in being able to speak it, to listen to it, to write in French 
and the like.17 As it turns out, we have myriads of multi-track dispositions 
and one could say that thinking of dispositions otherwise would be mis-
taken.18 Let us portrait this feature for sound. Sounds’ stimuli can be very 
diverse, which is already noticed by Kulvicki (2008, 9). In this sense, to give 
a dispositional analysis account for sounds while regarding them as dispo-
sitions had to be exhaustive. This can make us doubt on whether the defi-
nition of the stimuli of “when thwacked” is correct, for if you smash, make 
explode and so on, you will also have a sounding object.  
 Manifestation can diversify as well. Let us think of a musical instrument 
like the violin. A violin player knows that she can obtain different ‘colours’ 
depending on how she pulls the bow. If she bows near the bridge then we 
                                                 
16  Audibility is also used in the debate, but I will stress the difference below.  
17  While Ryle is the first one to brig up this idea, we owe its systematic treatment 
to Bird (2007, 23), who elaborated on all the combinations of stimuli-manifestation. 
His work on how such characterisations can, or not, account for fundamental and 
pure dispositions, leads him to proposes and a typology where we have simple stim-
ulus, conjunctive manifestation; disjunctive stimulus, simple manifestation; simple 
stimulus, but conjunctive manifestations; conjunctive stimulus, and a simple mani-
festation.  
18  For a comprehensive argument on how and why most if not all dispositions are 
multi-track, see (Vetter 2013b). 
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obtain a very specific and a bit harsh effect, a technique known as sul pon-
ticello; if she bows near the fingerboard, we have a rather sweet effect, 
known as sul tasto. If she plucks the strings instead of using the bow, we 
have pizzicato, and so on. Then the manifestations can be diverse and alt-
hough in these cases it seems that they connect one-to-one with the diver-
sity of stimuli, that is not necessarily the case. We can point to different 
examples. If you ‘thwack’ someone on the nose, maybe you would hear 
a sneeze, maybe not. Musical instruments are useful examples for all this, 
but they can be misleading in one particular aspect: unlike other objects, 
they are supposed to sound, sounding is what they are meant to do. When 
we turn to ‘ecological sounds,’ that disposition (taking for granted, for the 
sake of the argument, that they are such) can go along other with other 
dispositions, let alone multiple manifestations. As I will elaborate in the 
conclusions this leads to the problem of parasitical dispositions, which might 
represent a possible objection to sound dispositionalism.  
 This is not where the story ends. As it is known, there are plenty of 
counterexamples for the conditional analysis. Such is the case of masks—
i.e. entities that prevent the manifestation even if there is a disposition D 
and a stimulus S—and mimics—that is, when we have manifestations and 
stimulus but without the disposition D. The typical counterexamples for 
CA in the case of sound can come in two guises depending on how the man-
ifestation is understood: in a vibrational sense or in the phenomenological 
sense, that is, as the possibility of having, or not, the experience of sound.  
 A clear-cut case of a mask is that preventing the vibration in the me-
dium of the disposition-to-sound when actually having the stimulus. A si-
lencer or a pillow in the case of a firearm is a mask in a vibrational sense. 
Masks, as seen, may vary in their masking success. The other direction for 
masks is the phenomenological one. Maybe there is vibration, but there is 
some physical obstruction in one’s ear tragus that prevents you from having 
the experience-of-sound. Or if this is still too objectual, we could refer to 
some reactive response within the auditory system. For PV1 this is the 
mask and not the former; whereas for PV2 the emphasis would be in the 
former.  
 With mimics it happens in a similar way. The manifestation is produced 
either in spite of the absence of the disposition in the object to give away 
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a characteristic sound; or in absence of the subject’s disposition to have an 
experience of sound. This would happen via the intervention of a mimicker, 
like the famous case of ‘The Hater of Styrofoam’ (Lewis 1997): a Styrofoam 
dish would break when struck by intervention of the mimicker (i.e. The 
Hater of Styrofoam), even though the Styrofoam dish lacks that disposi-
tion.  
 We may envision the example of a guitar, which is not supposed to 
sound like a cello with pizzicato when plucking a string, yet via the inter-
vention of some mimicker, let us call it ‘the Cello-pizzicato lover,’ it would 
sound like a cello with pizzicato. Can we apply the difference between mak-
ing and having sounds like in the case of the speakers? I think so. However, 
‘orphan manifestations’ eventually raise some concerns (see §4). Some other 
counterexamples, like that of finks, are considerably more difficult to create 
for the case of sound than the already mentioned, and so far this is enough 
for contesting the conditional analysis. Conditional analysis, in order to 
respond to each of these cases, can reconfigure over and over with ceteris 
paribus clauses and with endless specifications that, in the long run, show 
that going through dispositions takes a lot to produce the correct state-
ments, if any. This line of response is identified by Manley and Wasserman 
(2008, 63) as the strategy of ‘getting specific.’ 
 Parsimony and simplicity are the desiderata that critics of conditional 
analysis have endorsed. A glass is still fragile even if nobody attempts to 
break it; an apple is edible even if no one is willing to eat it, and so on. In 
this fashion, Kulvicki already formulated that an object has a sound even 
if not sounding (or even if it is in a vacuum), and there is no need of going 
through a conditional analysis to state the disposition as it is.  
 For some reason, however, sound dispositionalism has not gone beyond 
standard conditional analyses to other current views. In order to advance 
this view, I deem necessary to explore other options. One of those options 
is that of potentialities, which is extensively explored by Barbara Vetter 
(2015).19  
                                                 
19  There are other works by other authors (Bird 2007; Molnar 2003) and Vetter 
herself that go in this direction, yet it is the one mentioned which fully develops the 
project.  
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 Joining in the attack on conditional analysis seems to represent a first 
obliged step. Noting, however, that objects still have their dispositions re-
gardless of the manifestation—i.e. a glass remains fragile even if no one 
breaks it—enables further considerations. The first one concerns us directly. 
In most cases we use the suffix ‘ity’ points to dispositions. And it concerns 
us for we still don’t know which is the candidate for sound in such fashion. 
The second consideration is that some objects having a disposition seems 
context-sensitive. Since there can be cases of things breaking that are not 
or could hardly be considered as ‘fragile,’ as well as people who get angry 
without being irascible, Vetter appeals, in a first moment, to the notion of 
‘easy possibility’ (Vetter 2015, 72). Yet it is unclear whether this commits 
us to possible worlds—for instance, that we have to consider worlds where 
something is likely to break and to distinguish it from those worlds where 
it is not—and what the relata are (for saying that something is easy is likely 
to say that it is easier than something else).  
 In this spirit, Vetter switches from dispositions to potentialities: “I pro-
pose that we call those properties which form the metaphysical background 
for dispositions ascriptions potentialities” (Vetter 2015, 84). Let us go back 
to the case of a rock. Intuitively, we would not say that a rock is fragile. 
Making that ascription entails the definition of a context, in a world where 
maybe there is a different force of gravity and things of the sort. The as-
cription of fragility, a typical disposition, is, as said before, context-sensi-
tive. Yet a rock can break. Both a glass and a rock—one of which you can 
ascribe fragility but not the other—can break. Therefore, we can appeal to 
a potentiality, which, if you like, can be expressed with the noun ‘breaka-
bility’ (which is not commonly used, if used at all). The difference with 
fragility is that fragility refers to a point of the spectrum where an object 
can break—you can fix the context using modal-talk, or by alluding to ‘easy 
possibility’; whereas breakability covers the whole spectrum from a piece of 
diamond to a thin glass. What we commonly refer as the disposition is the 
maximal degree in the spectrum, which attaches the suffix ‘ity’ enabling 
linguistic intuitions. Having a high degree of potentialities also explains 
manifestations. And, likewise, the rough picture indicates that having a 
sufficient or high degree of potentialities goes against having counteracting 
potentialities—which halt or prevent manifestations (Vetter 2015, 99).  
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 Concerning modal aspects, a full discussion is beyond the scope of this 
article, but there is a token of relevance that is worth mentioning. Potenti-
ality, as portrayed by Vetter, is still a sort of modality, but it is localised 
in the object in contrast with metaphysical possibility, which is non-local-
ised (Vetter 2015, 203). Hence, rather than formulations such as “it is pos-
sible that x”, we can appeal to “x can M.”20 
 It is clear by now that Vetter offers an account of potentiality that tries 
to be independent of other explanans that come about when the manifesta-
tion of dispositions/potentialities is exerted. Many of the things we come to 
think of as definitional of potentiality are interacting factors of the exertion 
of the potentiality (its manifestation or production), and yet not essential. 
So there is no need to appeal to the whole conditional analysis conceptual 
package in order to interpret potentialities, as it happens with change and 
causation. Of course, change and causation may play a role in how the 
potentiality is exerted, but they are not definitional.21 If anything, we can 
explain causality via dispositions (Chakravarty 2007; Vetter 2015, 99). The 
                                                 
20  Vetter (2013a) claims that it is possible to express potentiality regardless of 
possible worlds. The reasons on why linking them was part of a canon is yet not as 
clear. And that happens as well with causality, Humeanism, conditional analysis and 
supervenience, which seem to be somehow entangled. This entanglement appears 
also when discussing modality. Lewis is well known for being, among other things, 
a modal realist (Lewis 1986a). In his quest for arraying his picture of possible worlds 
and to look for alternatives to modal operators, he first proposed a counterpart 
theory (Lewis 1968) and then found that supervenience is a convenient tool (’the 
right one’) for his modelling throughout possible worlds (Lewis 1986a). In contrast, 
Vetter (2011b) identifies Kit Fine’s efforts and hers on the side of ‘new actualism,’ 
which happens to be confronted with that of Lewis. Both sides could agree, however, 
on their search for new tools to reflect on modality (Lewis idem, Vetter 2013a). At 
a point, she uses modal talk identifying ‘possible worlds’ as heuristic (Vetter 2015). 
For her, new actualism and ‘anti-Humean’ metaphysics are on the same page (Vetter 
2011b, 745). I am not entirely sure these associations apply at large concerning 
Humeanism/modal realism and actualism/anti-Humeanism, since the basic idea of 
supervenience doesn’t need ab initio modalities (either with typical modal operators 
or with Lewis’ counterpart theory). 
21  For a detailed account on how and why we should avoid causal construal in 
dispositional explanations without going through modalities the way Vetter does and 
by taking into considerations epistemological aspects see Gurova (2017). 
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first rebuke of a certain idea of foundational causality is that of rejecting 
conditional analysis whenever the stimulus is a cause, and the manifesta-
tion, an effect (Vetter 2015, 96). This does not mean that potentialities are 
dissociated from causal schemes. But not even in all cases manifestations 
have causes attached. Vetter mentions the possibility of spontaneous reac-
tions.22 So it happens with change: a potentiality may remain as it is and, 
even if that is rare or uninteresting, they do exist.  
 Going back to sound dispositionalism, we can think of sound as a po-
tentiality. Typically, the acoustic spectrum covers human perception 
thresholds according to wavelength frequencies. Vibrations below of 20 Hz, 
like those of earthquakes, are considered infrasonic; whereas those above 
that threshold, like a dog whistle, are known as ultrasounds. It is interesting 
that the disposition to sound does not consider a maximal degree of fre-
quency, but rather to be located at a specific range within the spectrum. 
This might lead us to reconsider the idea of associating a typical disposition 
with the ‘maximal degree’ in Vetter’s account. Since this perspective also 
frees us from the chains of linguistic intuitions and it is context independ-
ent, we could cast aside for a minute the concern of not finding a suitable 
noun with the suffix ‘ity’. We could brand it as acoustic potentiality.  
 So far, I have said very little on how this relates to the perceiving subject 
or how and why we can consider or rule out other ‘ity’-nouns for naming 
this acoustic potentiality. A last feasible element that can be addressed with 
the new conceptual device at hand is that of loudness and, presumably, 
loudability. That would be certainly a gradable potentiality. One could won-
der however whether we should substitute acoustic potentiality for this. 
I think that should not be the case, since loudability refers to an audible 
quality of sound. This could give place to a known objection as the ‘property 
of properties,’ which I will address in the next paragraph. For now, it suf-
fices to say I do not take this as a lethal objection against sound disposi-
tionalism.  
 Potentiality’s basic elements have been introduced (i.e. gradability, con-
text-independence, localised modality) and how we can think of sounds with 
                                                 
22  Vetter (2015, 98) mentions that for a dualist philosopher getting angry could be 
a spontaneous affair, rather than the outcome of a sufficient cause.  
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them. Now some auxiliary elements may also help us to have a more com-
plete picture. I would add only two: the difference between intrinsic and 
extrinsic and the idea of joint potentialities. An intrinsic property is con-
tained in the object and it does not depend on any outer conditions. Pre-
sumably shape can be such a property; while properties such as being “taller 
than you” are relational and, therefore, extrinsic since they depend on ex-
ternal objects, conditions, and so on.23 As for joint potentiality, its formu-
lation goes in hand with that of extrinsic and intrinsic potentialities. An 
orchestra, for instance, shows the plurality of potentialities of each musician 
for playing a particular instrument. Another example is that of a key, which 
has the potentiality of opening a door. This is a useful token, because it 
points to both joint potentialities—the potentiality of a key to open a door, 
and the potentiality of a door to be opened—and to the difference between 
intrinsic (the potentiality of opening a particular door) and extrinsic (the 
potentiality of opening a general type of door, regardless of that type actu-
ally existing) (Vetter 2015, 124).  
 In order to implement some of the novel elements mentioned here, we 
have to go back to one of our initial hindrances: that we do not have an 
intuitive candidate attaching the suffix ‘ity’ for depicting sound as a dispo-
sition. In an objectual sense we could point out to ‘sonority’. Although 
‘sonority,’ in certain contexts, could allude to something else than the “dis-
position/potentiality to sound,” when, for example, we say that:  
 “The sonority of Tchaikovsky Hall is better than Carnegie Hall” 
Which is the same—imprecise and folk—usage we have for “acoustics.” In 
this case we are actually referring to the disposition connected with rever-
beration of a space. Now, in spite of already having a more compelling idea 
of an acoustic potentiality, there is another candidate that comes around, 
which has, though, a slightly different character. Such is the case of ‘audi-
bility,’ which is repeatedly used in the literature on the philosophy of 
sound’s literature (for instance in O’Callaghan 2011, 400). 
                                                 
23  Dispositionalists discuss, however, whether extrinsic dispositions are adequate, 
for the canon used to be that they were all intrinsic (for instance Molnar 2003). Here 
I will just assume we can include them. For reviewing a comprehensive plea for 
extrinsic dispositions, see (McKitrick 2003).  
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 So far, the discussion has remained in a distal sense, that is, it portrays 
the property as objectual and that has the advantage of bracketing percep-
tion, which is a difficult issue in the philosophy of sounds. Albeit difficult, it 
is nonetheless decisive and that is probably the reason why sound has been 
traditionally considered a secondary quality. Framing audibility in this sense 
seems not only pertinent, but the very way to address dispositions and po-
tentialities in the philosophy of sound. Audibility and sonority are extension-
ally the same, the difference lies in the fact that the former is addressed in 
a merely objectual sense, but that is a rather narrow picture that does not 
accurately describes sound’s nature as a secondary quality. I can address 
this topic only now that I have elaborated on the adequate conceptual ele-
ments to depict its dynamics. One of the mentioned elements suits perfectly 
the occasion: joint potentiality (Vetter 2015, 2019b). In this case we have 
more than one actor in the circuit: the sounding object, the hearer, which 
is given also in a spectrum of frequency concerning the audibility/inaudi-
bility of a vibration. Audibility jointly acts, thus, with at least other two 
potentialities: the one bestowed on the hearer, which is close to what audiol-
ogists describe as “hearing capacity” when, for example, describing the use of 
audiograms (Parker and Parker 2004, 76), and the vibrational potentiality of 
the object. Having a sound is, thus, just a fragment of the whole picture of 
a jointly dispositional acting scheme. From this new perspective we do not 
have to think of the medium as a condition in terms of the conditional anal-
ysis, but rather as an entity that provides for a joint potentiality.  
 Besides, Vetter’s approach offers yet another element to understand dis-
positions; a remaining problem in the philosophy of sound and auditory 
experience is that of sound individuation, a problem ‘infamously difficult to 
resolve’ (O’Callaghan 2007, 64). From the point of view of potentiality, 
a disposition is individuated by its manifestation, full stop (Vetter 2014, 
752). As we have dispensed from dealing with change, causation and mo-
dality, being sound a disposition/potentiality, the problem of its individua-
tion is no longer a great concern. This will prove even more relevant while 
reviewing the objections raised against PV and sound dispositionalism. Tak-
ing stock, even if this picture is, as I believe, more complete than the one 
offered by the authors who have pursued sound dispositionalism, it still 
faces challenges that I deem difficult to sort out, as I elaborate below.  
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4. Objections against the dispositional wiew,  
known and new  
 Objections to the dispositional view so far have been directed mainly 
against Pasnau and Kulvicki and, curiously enough, they do not consider 
the structure of the conditional analysis of dispositions nor do they focus 
their criticisms on the internal aspects of dispositions themselves. The goal 
of the critique is usually oriented towards showing that the ontological 
choice they make is more compelling, so they rather pick it on problematic 
aspects of the theory. Thus, although there are particular objections, we 
still lack a robust systematic critique.  
 Casati and Dokic (2014) notice several objections of this nature. The 
first one is that our ordinary language does not recognize those uses of 
sounds (Pasnau [1999, 310] also stresses this). However, since the first lines 
of this paper I show how there is an ordinary and intuitive way of expressing 
that something “has a sound” and that, as a matter of fact, points out the 
main issue: their dispositional nature (iff, of course, sounds happen to be 
dispositions). A common philosophical strategy is to appeal to the intuitive 
nature of ordinary language. However, the reasons why philosophical con-
cepts should accommodate to ordinary language, and to what extent, are 
a matter of debate. A reason on why this remains at issue may have to do 
with the problem of individuation and the assertion according to which 
“sounds are particulars”. 
 O’Callaghan (2011) has also raised some important objections. A coin-
cidence he has with Casati and Dokic is that of pointing to the “many 
properties problem” (O’Callaghan 2011, 378). If sounds were properties, the 
audible properties we usually attach to sound (and mostly to musical 
sound), namely, timbre, pitch, and loudness or intensity would be depend-
ent or second degree. In any case, O’Callaghan anticipates a complex prop-
erty-like response.24 However, in this scenario and appealing to parsimony, 
he concludes that EV fares better. In fact, any view that holds that sounds 
are particulars would fare likewise, so it is not a virtue unique to EV.  
                                                 
24  Theorising about hierarchies while dealing with properties and their inter-array 
is not uncommon to metaphysics. An interesting view on this dealing directly with 
dispositions and powers is that of Molnar (2003).  
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 Another problematic issue is that of change. Typically, in metaphysics 
properties are not taken to be subject to change, the way individuals are. 
With O’Callaghan (2011, 379) it is unclear whether he concurs to this, since, 
after emphasising that sounds are concrete particulars—not object-like, but 
rather event-like—he claims that although both sounds and objects survive 
change, they differ in the fact that sounds need of time for unfolding and 
happening. Moreover, individuation of the formers does depend in the pat-
terns of change in their audible features.  
 Concerning change, Pasnau (1999, 319–20) does not grant that sounds 
are subject to change. Much of the evidence we have of change in sound, he 
says, depends on our perception. Something similar happens with the per-
ception of size: we perceive things to be bigger or smaller in relation to our 
proximity to them, the same happens with our perception and ‘measure-
ment’ of intensity, for which, in his opinion, “sound itself remains un-
changed.” 
 Not all supporters of PV think accordingly, Roberts (2017, 341), for 
instance, gives an example on how a change of colour could be possible 
pointing out to the intensity of colours in a strange colour world.25 The 
same, presumably, could be exemplified for sound: the marker for intensity 
would be loudness. Actually, it is easier to imagine qualitative change in 
sound than in colour. While playing string instruments, a change in pitch 
                                                 
25  It goes as follows: “Imagine a world in which all objects were (mostly) transpar-
ent but when caused to vibrate suddenly became colored and would exemplify one 
color after another for some time before again becoming transparent. The exact 
colors objects would exemplify would depend on the type of object and how much it 
vibrated. For example, dense objects would exemplify different determinable colors 
on average than less dense objects, and objects would exemplify different determi-
nate colors of the density-determined determinable color dependent on how much 
they were vibrating. If a very dense object were caused to slightly vibrate it would 
become light red, then a lighter red, then lighter, then white, and then the white 
would fade and the object would again be transparent, and if a less dense object 
were caused to vibrate lightly it would become a light blue, then a lighter blue, then 
lighter, and then white before fading back to being transparent, and if the object 
were caused to vibrate more heavily it would become a dark blue, and then a lighter 
blue, and lighter, then white, and again the whiteness would fade to transparency” 
(Roberts 2017, 341). 
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can occur when using the technique known as glissando, or while simply 
tuning the instrument; a flute can produce in a note a considerable increase 
in intensity.26 
 By linking confronted views on how sounds survive, or not, change with 
compliance to ordinary language, Cohen (2010) notes that both views—that 
is, survivalist and non-survivalist—can be both acceptable, for which we 
should not use this as a definitive criterion.  
 The last and main objection is that which actually could undermine any 
sort of PV: the claim according to which sounds are particulars. This comes 
in two fashions: the first one is appealing to countability; the second one is 
by invoking experiencing particulars. The bedrock of these arguments goes 
like this: particulars have features that arguably properties do not. So, if 
some of these traits can be encountered while addressing sounds, it is un-
likely that they can be taken as properties. Now, there are two considera-
tions here: either it is impossible for properties to have these features, be-
cause they are exclusives for particulars; or it is only that they are present 
in particulars, but not necessarily in an exclusive sense.  
 Countability is also connected with this particular-like sort of objection: 
you can count particulars, and you can count sounds, therefore, sounds are 
particulars. Arguably, you cannot do the same with properties and, there-
fore, sounds are not properties. Here is a disanalogy with colour: you cannot 
count ‘colours,’ which is taken to be a property; but you can count sounds. 
Therefore, sounds are not like colours and they are not properties. Taking 
nonetheless the challenge, one could say that what is countable in that sense 
is the manifestation, which shows the way in which any disposition is indi-
viduated (Vetter 2015, 35, 108). On the other hand, sound could even be 
used as a mass-term as well (Cohen 2010; Méndez-Martínez 2019). Finally, 
in Roberts’ ‘strange colour world’ the manifestation of a colour can be also 
the number of times you switch the light on and off.  
 This gives an answer to the question raised by Casati and Dokic: “What 
are the particulars that you hear when you hear something?” So, the prop-
erty theorist could simply answer: property manifestations. 
                                                 
26  Changes in timbre seem more difficult to use as an example, but theoretically 
we should not rule them out.  
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 So far so good, these known objections and the responses to them are 
all very well, even if some rely on desiderata (parsimony, concordance with 
ordinary language) whose relevance could be queried. A general and sys-
tematic objection that could counter PV and sound dispositionalism at large 
is still pendant. I would like to posit here what, in my view, should be its 
main guidelines.  
 Despite philosophy’s different standards and historical development pat-
terns to those of science, a criterion that comes in handy while examining 
an argument is that of falsifiability. In a Popperian spirit we could ask how 
sound dispositionalism could be proved false. There are several goals that 
can be assessed and, thus, falsified. The broader one is that which states 
"sounds are properties” (T1). A way to falsify this out is to deny that claim: 
 AT1: Sounds are not properties 
EV, WV and claiming that sounds are particulars seem to entail AT1. How-
ever, just stating that they are particulars does not constitute an argument 
in and of itself, it requires burden of proof. That is a difficulty we encounter 
with O’Callaghan’s (2011) arguments against PV, for he heavily relies on 
the characterisation of sounds as particulars (not object-like, but event-
like), implying that those features could not belong to properties. However, 
as shown above, those features can be predicated of disposition’s manifes-
tations, as already said. Continuing with the—hypothetical—global system-
atic objection, if sounds were properties, then we would have to decide 
between PV1 and PV2. Asserting one discredits, seemingly, the other, and, 
thus, within PV, PV1 could be the antithesis of PV2 and vice versa. It is 
important to notice that this would be so only if we have overcome the 
challenge posit by AT1. So far, I have argued that, if they are properties, 
they are objectual properties, which, naturally, are enabled by our percep-
tive capacities.  
 If the argument develops through the path of objectual properties 
(namely PV2), then there are also contesting views. A fundamental one is, 
as mentioned earlier, that of choosing between categorical and dispositional. 
In this sense, either one:  
– Chooses categoralist monism in order to advance this view or to dis-
credit dispositions 
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– Chooses dispositionalist monism in order to advance this view or to 
discredit categorical properties 
– Chooses a mild pluralist or dualist position that admits both; yet 
focus on one of the two.  
 Naturally, if one were to choose a monist position it would have to be 
followed to its last consequences, which could undermine or even compro-
mise the project. Categoricalism usually tries to undermine not only dispo-
sitionalist monism, but dispositions themselves and, thus, to challenge dis-
positional realism (that is, the stance for which dispositions do exist). Turn-
ing a blind eye to monism, a pluralist pax metaphysica, could engage with 
their preferred type of property without troubling dispositionalist talk or 
categoricalist talk, depending on one’s focus. I believe that in the philosophy 
of sound and auditory experience we face such a situation and, hence the 
goal is far from asserting a dispositional view in detriment of a categoricalist 
one. And that is fine. While there is nothing intrinsically wrong with this, 
it would be better to keep in mind the falsifiability routes for dispositional-
ism.  
 Finally, and narrowing the scale to those views that are not only PV, 
but dispositionalist themselves, the local theory choice seems to boil down 
to two options: conditional analysis or potentiality. Here the choice is not 
so simple, as conditional analysis is committed to more than it states in the 
analysis itself within the Humean project. However, there may be theoreti-
cal scenarios where both ways of framing dispositions are admissible. For 
instance, one could accept potentiality, and say that only dispositions (that 
is the maximal degree of a potentiality) can be framed with some reformed 
conditional analysis, but not the whole spectrum. To my knowledge, there 
are no claims in this direction, but maybe there is room for pluralism of 
this kind.  
 The advanced picture I offer here is not bulletproof and we could con-
ceive extra hindrances to its theoretical development. Let us consider new 
objections. Even though Kulvicki underestimates the case of sounds made 
and not had as a rara avis, there are more cases of ‘orphan sounds.’ Con-
sider the case of a thunder. EV has no problem in cataloguing these both 
as sounding sources and as events—and not even Kulvicki denies that  
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hearing informs us of the surrounding events. Many specifications are 
needed to frame clouds as objects. On the other hand, objectless or individ-
ualess properties seem to make no sense (Armstrong 1993, 433); although 
Galen Strawson (2011, 304) thinks differently. Now, it may be the case that 
thunders and all what is involved in the natural phenomenon of the water 
cycle is still a particular yet not an object-like one, but event-like, as O’Cal-
laghan says. Granted. Still we could wonder what happens with manifesta-
tions, like orphan sounds, that are neither relatable to objects nor to dispo-
sitions. Therefore, orphan sounds just make a larger problem evident: that 
of lonely manifestations and mere happenings.  
 This leads us to the point where we can find most of the objections to 
dispositionalist theories, including those of sound dispositionalism: the 
way they relate to stimulus and manifestations and, thus, to its multi-
track nature. Although conditional analysis has generally been abandoned 
in the discussion on dispositions and potentialities, the other aspects in 
the circuit that are linked to dispositions can still raise concerns. Here 
I would like to propose the idea of ‘parasitical dispositions.’ Something 
already considered in the formulation of multi-track dispositions is the 
possibility for a disposition to have multiple manifestations, and multiple 
stimuli as well. That is not new. In this sense, we can use the typical case 
of a glass’ fragility. When breaking, however, the glass also sounds. There 
is a characteristic sound of a breaking glass that is familiar to most of us. 
However, either both dispositions go in tandem, or one is dependent on 
the other. This is what I have in mind with parasitic dispositions: the 
possibility that the disposition to sound could be the disposition of some-
thing else.  
 The notion of parasitical disposition is in need of a larger framework not 
only within philosophy of sounds, but also in the overall literature on pow-
ers and dispositions. Being a parasite is being a parasite of something. Thus, 
the idea implies a hierarchy that can be fixed bearing in mind an ecological 
array of how organisms perceive stimulus: sounds are relevant for animals 
that are either hunter or pray because they indicate something else than 
sounds per se. EV would refer right away to the causal relationship between 
sounds and its sources, but it is clear that from this side we have to look 
for an alternative. The combination of joint potentialities and Gibsonian 
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affordances (Vetter 2018),27 for instance, may enable this approach. A par-
asitical disposition is one that has not affordances and yet it is instantiated 
with dispositions-potentialities that do have them. It is important to see 
that a parasitical disposition would not be a counteracting potentiality, 
which in the criticism of conditional analysis is presented as a ‘mask.’ We 
must conceive unperceived properties that do nothing. The fact that sounds 
don’t happen to be in this category is an evolutionary making. There could 
be possible worlds, however, where sounds would not play such a role.28  
 Finally, an extra objection that follows the line of argument of ‘things 
particulars have but properties don’t’ is that of parthood. Let’s call this the 
mereological29 objection. Although we certainly would not say that:  
 “Here is a sound. There you have half of that sound.” 
You can appeal to lengths and durations in the following sense:  
 “This sound lasted half the length of the previous sound.” 
Perhaps, this is something a sound engineer or a composer could say. 
Clearly, sound is not the sort of discrete entity you can halve, like an apple 
or a table, and there are two non-equivalent solutions to this: either you 
say that this is something that happens with events in general, which are 
particulars in the end—as O’Callaghan would probably argue; or as the 
property theorists (dispositionalist included) would do, one could talk about 
the theoretical mereology of properties’ manifestations (as in Robert’s 
strange world of colour). The topic, however, remains unexplored. 
 Up to this point, it is evident that the discussion on dispositions can 
contribute to the metaphysics and ontology of sound. It is in the best  
                                                 
27  In Gibson’s ecological psychology, an affordance is a habitat feature that enables 
an organism to do something: “a surface that is knee-high and sufficiently steady 
affords sitting on.” Barbara Vetter (2018) has worked on bringing together the phi-
losophy of potentiality and this approach.  
28  This resembles a Lewinsian idea: that of idlers, namely, properties that just 
manifest and ‘do nothing’ (Lewis 2008, 75). Perhaps our world is full of these things 
and it is just a matter of evolutionary serendipity that sounds happen to be relevant 
for so many species.  
29  Unlike O’Callaghan (2011), I do refer here to mereology in its classical sense: as 
the study of the relationship between parts and wholes. 
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interest of property theories to explore this possibility and face its conse-
quences for, as I have shown, it has attractive theoretical features, albeit 
problematic. Not only it is worth reviewing for the property theorist but 
also for those accounting for EV or even WV. This is where my last advice 
goes. Although here I provide elements that can advance sound disposition-
alism, there is maybe a good reason not to take this route in a reductionist 
way. By ‘reductionist’ I mean the ontological reduction of sound to the 
class of potentialities (and dispositions). This explanatory misplacement 
is a product of the aim of terminological reduction that looms in the views 
in SO. And this criticism is analogous to one of the main objections to-
wards WV. For sure, acoustic waves have to do with the auditory phe-
nomena but being part of the explanatory scheme does not imply the 
claim “sounds are waves.” There is a sense in which much of the discussion 
can be arranged by means of specifying our usages of ‘sound’ in our ex-
planatory schemes. Maybe there is room for everyone. Yet a difference 
here is that whereas acoustic waves’ importance is undeniable in order to 
have the picture of sound, dispositions or potentialities require more jus-
tification.  
 Avoiding a reduction of this kind would allow the necessary distance 
from the problem noticed by Casati and Dokic (2014) concerning the col-
lapsing or conflation of views, which are supposedly antagonistic.30 In con-
clusion, dispositions or potentialities are potentially useful tools for the 
philosophical investigation of the realm of the auditory phenomena and 
they may be used in the discussion, but it is perhaps unwise to reduce  
and circumscribe the ontology of sound to the class of dispositional prop-
erties as it might be to do so with other classes (waves or events for 
instance).  
                                                 
30  In particular, Casati and Dokic are aiming a critique towards the Relational 
Event Theory, which intends appealing to both the surrounding medium and the 
source, that is, articulating distal and medial theories. However, for these authors 
this view (which is O’Callaghan’s arguably) “collapses unto” a medial theory when 
considering puzzling cases where an informational barrier prevents us to access 
a sounding object. In such circumstances, this theory, they say, ends up being plainly 
medial.  
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